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FREEDOM OR THEOCRACY?:
CONSTITUTIONALISM IN AFGHANISTAN AND
IRAQ
By Hannibal Travis *
“Afghans are victims of the games superpowers once played: their war was once
our war, and collectively we bear responsibility.”1
“In the approved version of the [Afghan] constitution, Article 3 was amended to
read, ‘In Afghanistan, no law can be contrary to the beliefs and provisions of the
sacred religion of Islam.’ … This very significant clause basically gives the
official and nonofficial religious leaders in Afghanistan sway over every action
that they might deem contrary to their beliefs, which by extension and within the
Afghan cultural context, could be regarded as ‘beliefs’ of Islam.”2
“The lopsided [electoral] victory by Iraq’s Shiite Muslim alliance gives it the
biggest voice in shaping the nation’s new government and constitution…. Will
Sharia, or Islamic law, become the main reference for national policy on divorce,
censorship, the role of women in society, broadcasting and public morality, as
many Shiite clerics and their followers insist?”3
INTRODUCTION
¶1

¶2

During the past four years, the United States has replaced two dictatorial regimes in
majority Islamic countries with more democratic governments. These interventions enforced the
“Bush doctrine,” the declaration of President George W. Bush after the murder of nearly 3,000
Americans by Saudi and Egyptian terrorists on September 11 that all states “harboring” or
supporting terrorists would see their leaders deposed and pro-American ones installed.4 The
Bush doctrine, its adherents plausibly argue, has profoundly advanced the cause of human rights
in Afghanistan and Iraq. Specifically, it liberated Afghans and Iraqis from dictatorships with two
of the worst human rights records in the world, replacing them with constitutional democracies
ostensibly devoted to respecting individual rights.
Activists for human rights and religious freedom have been more critical concerning the
United States’ role in the political processes of Afghanistan and Iraq. They argue that the
paradoxical effect of President Bush’s policies is to have replaced two unstable, marginalized
regimes with what may become enduring and universally recognized Islamic fundamentalist
states, albeit with greater democratic credentials.5 The new constitutions of Afghanistan and Iraq
have enshrined Islam as the official religion and source of legislation, which no social policies
may contravene. This codification of religious fundamentalism was an inevitable byproduct,
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some observers contend, of the delegation of the nation-building process in both countries to
religious extremists who enjoyed devoted followings of armed militiamen.
This article explores this debate by analyzing legal developments in Afghanistan and Iraq,
with a particular focus on Afghanistan’s new constitution, ratified in early 2004 before the first
post-Taliban elections were held. The Afghan constitution symbolizes the unmistakable
liberation of Afghanistan’s people from the despotic and even genocidal rule of the Taliban, but
its many provisions requiring compatibility of government policy with an unwritten code of
Islamic law may allow grave human rights violations to continue, and frustrate democratic
demands for respect for international human rights standards and the country’s civil law
traditions. Accelerated judicial reform will be necessary to ensure that the provisions in the
constitution for judicial review of laws for conformity to religious doctrine will not be utilized to
implement theocratic rule, which is the result that many powerful Afghans, possessing armed
militias used to intimidate their political opponents, are working towards.
Afghan modernizers and fundamentalists have enjoyed varying degrees of foreign support
and intervention throughout the twentieth century. Depending on how the new constitution is
interpreted, the past support of the U.S. and its allies to some of the most radical elements of the
fundamentalist camp may have assured their enduring victory. Part I of the Article explores the
historical context in which Afghanistan’s new constitution was drafted and ratified, and the
unique responsibility of the U.S. and the Soviet Union in creating that context. Part II traces the
rise and fall of the Taliban theocracy, which murdered thousands of political opponents and
religious minorities, and intensified the fundamentalist oppression of Afghans instituted after the
fall of the communist Afghan regime. Part III describes how after the rout of the Taliban, the
U.S. accepted Afghan fundamentalists into prominent positions from which they could control
the process by which Afghanistan would draft and ratify its new constitution and develop a postTaliban legal system. Part IV proposes some test cases for judging the implementation of
Afghanistan’s new constitution and judicial reform efforts from the perspective of democracy
and individual rights, including new bans on blasphemy and political secularism that are ripe for
systematic abuse, plans to revive fundamentalist punishments avoided by most modern states
such as stoning and amputation, and the ongoing oppression and enslavement of Afghan women
and girls.
The article concludes by drawing some parallels between the Afghan constitutional process
and the ongoing process of transitioning Iraq from a nominally socialist dictatorship with a
genocidal record into a so-called “Islamic democracy.”6 Many Iraqis, and almost all residents of
majority Kurdish areas of northern Iraq, report being better off as a result of the U.S.-led
operation to remove Saddam Hussein from power.7 But as in Afghanistan, the Iraqi delegates
handpicked by the U.S and the U.N. to draft a constitution have established Iraq as a religious
state. At the behest of powerful fundamentalists with private armies, the drafters of the interim
Iraqi constitution included language providing for judicial review of legislation for conformity to
an unspecified, but probably fundamentalist, version of religious law. At the same time, more
than 100,000 Iraqis have died violently since the war began; Iraqi fundamentalists are murdering
and raping members of the indigenous Christian population at an accelerated pace, prompting
tens of thousands to flee the country; and Iraqi women are facing new restrictions on their
freedom of movement and dress, as well as deprivation of their rights in marriage and divorce.
The actions and public statements of Iraq’s most prominent religious leaders, to which the likely
leaders of the new Iraq will defer if present trends continue, raise precisely the same sorts of
concerns as the fundamentalist policies that have continued in Afghanistan.
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HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF THE RISE OF THE TALIBAN THEOCRACY
Pre-Constitutional Afghanistan
¶6

Like many countries, Afghanistan had no written constitution prior to the twentieth
century. The land was ruled either as a province of another empire, or independently by an
Afghan monarch or local tribal leaders.8 For many centuries, the legal system had its basis in a
combination of Sharia law9 and ancient customs such as the jirga, a council of tribal elders
convened to settle important issues,10 and Pashtunwali, the Pashtun code of conduct emphasizing
conservative family values and the seclusion of women from public view.11 Around the turn of
the 20th century, Afghanistan opened up to secular influences and women’s rights by abolishing
some forced marriages, raising the minimum marriageable age, liberalizing women’s access to
divorce and rights of inheritance, and prohibiting extravagant gifts to a bride’s family that could
be used in essence to purchase a girl from her parents.12
Constitutional Monarchy

¶7

The events leading up to and following the adoption of the first Afghan constitution would
be repeated many times in Afghan history: a set of policies looking towards the future and the
West infuriated fundamentalists, whose opposition was violently suppressed but eventually
succeeded, with foreign intervention, in deposing the regime responsible for the new policies.
¶8
On April 9, 1923, Amanullah Khan, the Amir of Afghanistan, secured the ratification by a
Loya Jirga of Afghanistan’s first written constitution.13 The 1923 constitution set forth a
blueprint for modernizing Afghanistan and assuring greater rights for Afghan women and
religious minorities within the framework of Islamic governance. It guaranteed that all Afghan
subjects would have “equal rights in accordance with Sharia and the laws of the state.”14 Some
Afghans interpreted this provision as entitling Afghan women to citizenship and equal rights.15
The constitution promised greater rights to religious minorities such as the Hazaras, who as Shia
Muslims had been labeled as infidels and massacred and enslaved in the nineteenth century for
this reason.16 It abolished torture, slavery, and forced labor17 ; created a legislature, although the
Amir would appoint the Prime Minister and many of its members18 ; and decreed that followers
of religions other than Islam, such as Hinduism and Judaism, were entitled to the protection of
the state.19 Elementary education became compulsory for all Afghan “citizens.”20
¶9
Despite its modernizing aspirations, the 1923 constitution established what would be
considered theocratic rule by contemporary standards. A “theocracy,” literally speaking, would
be the direct rule by a divine being on Earth21 ; this possibility having been disavowed by
mainstream Christianity and Islam, most theocracies in fact consist of “government by priests or
men claiming to know the will of God.”22 By this definition, Afghanistan’s 1923 constitution
was theocratic by virtue of the authority it invested in men claiming to know the will of God.
The constitution made the “sacred” and official religion of the state, and enshrined the King as
the “servant and the protector of the true religion of Islam.”23 It instructed legislators to give
“careful consideration” to the “requirements of the laws of Sharia.”24 Perhaps most importantly,
it provided that in Afghan courts of justice, “all disputes and cases will be decided in accordance
with the principles of Sharia and of general civil and criminal laws.”25 The judiciary, in this
instance as in others, served as the key instrument of fundamentalist Islamic theocracy.26
¶10
Taking on centuries-old customs, Amir Amnullah Khan introduced ambitious legislative
reforms improving Afghan women’s rights. The Amir declared that Afghan women would no
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longer “be treated as second-class Muslims.”27 In 1921, he enacted a Family Code banning child
marriage, marriages between close relatives, excessive dowries, and the exchange of women as
“blood money” in payment of interfamilial disputes.28 He opened girls’ schools and sent women
students abroad for higher education.29 After 1923, the Amir introduced Afghanistan’s first civil
code,30 which abolished polygamy and marriages to all girls under the age of 18.31 His wife
Soraya appeared unveiled in public and participated actively in politics, citing the example of
women in the “early years of Islam.”32
Not satisfied with the constitution’s gestures towards theocracy, and disappointed with
King Amanullah’s record as the “protector” of Islam, Afghanistan’s religious elite quickly
moved to overthrow and reverse his modernizing reforms. The head of a prominent religious
family, which served as “king makers” in Afghan society,33 immediately denounced the 1923
constitution as a “communist” document.34 A rebellion reached the outskirts of the capital
Kabul, and was only repelled when the Amir mobilized his new air force to strafe and bomb the
advancing insurgents,35 and then executed the revolt’s leaders.36
Rebels having nearly toppled his regime, the Amir called a Loya Jirga to amend the 1923
constitution in several important respects designed to pacify Afghanistan’s religious elite.37 One
amendment made the Hanafi school of Islamic law the official religious rite of Afghanistan.38
Additional concessions from the Amir included “watering down” the rights of women,39
reintroducing torture when “in accordance with the rules of the Sharia,”40 and allowing a Council
of Islamic Scholars to “decide whether new laws were in accordance with Islamic law.”41
After Amir Amanullah became King of Afghanistan in 1926, he announced further
sweeping reforms aimed at helping Afghan women.42 He endorsed expanding Afghan girls’
access to education, proclaimed his opposition to the compulsory veiling of women, and imposed
Western dress within the capital of Kabul. 43 In response, Afghan religious leaders once again led
conservative Afghan tribes in rebellion. Under siege, King Amanullah abdicated the throne in
early 1929.44 Historians tend to blame the King’s overhasty reforms for his downfall, especially
those dealing with mandatory veiling, the seclusion of women, and forced and underage
marriages.45 But the West failed to support the King who admired its values, and Britain actively
worked to overthrow him. Many Afghans and even the British press believed that the British
Empire was behind Amanullah’s fall from power, given the Empire’s poor relations with him.46
King Amanullah’s successors quickly overturned his reforms. But in doing so, they did
not return Afghanistan to a pre-modern or pre-constitutional condition. Instead, they established
an Islamic constitutional monarchy that, despite its theocratic aspects, also retained some of the
1923 constitution’s gestures towards reform.
A Loya Jirga in 1930 created Afghanistan’s next stable government and pronounced Nadir
Shah as Afghanistan’s King.47 The King promulgated the second Afghan constitution in 1931.48
With a few minor changes, it endured as Afghanistan’s governing charter for more than 30
years.49 Like the 1923 constitution, it embraced tradition while looking tentatively towards the
future. On the side of tradition, it made the Hanafi school of Islam the state religion, established
a requirement that all legislation conform to the Sharia, and gave religious authorities the power
to review Afghan laws and governmental policies for correspondence to Sharia law. 50 But it also
guaranteed compulsory elementary education, freedom of the press within the limits of the
Sharia, and a limited role for democratically elected officials to participate in the drafting of
legislation.51 Afghan women became eligible to vote in elections, although the authorities later
declared this provision to be incompatible with Islamic law.52
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King Nadir Shah’s government enforced Afghan women’s obligation to wear the allcovering burqa, a tent-like covering that obscures the entire person and leaves only a mesh
opening to see through.53 The new King reinvigorated purdah (the Persian word for “curtain”),
or the prohibition against women participating in public life or having contact with any men
other than their husbands or those close relatives whom they are forbidden to marry. 54 In
Afghanistan, these “restrictions severely limit women’s activities, including access to education
and employment outside the home. Many [women] are largely confined to their homes.”55
The King was assassinated in 1933,56 leaving his throne to his 19-year old son Zahir.57
King Zahir Shah would preside over the slow improvement of living conditions in Afghanistan
for over 40 years after his father’s death in 1933.58 As Prime Minister, the King’s first cousin
Muhammed Daoud Khan strove to develop Afghanistan’s economy by securing vast amounts of
economic and military aid from the neighboring Soviet Union.59 The U.S. also initiated several
important development projects in Afghanistan, but declined to supply military aid.60
In 1959, Prime Minister Daoud created a major cultural crisis when the wives and
daughters of the Afghan royal family appeared unveiled for the first time since Amanullah’s
reign.61 Many religious leaders publicly condemned this display, but Daoud argued that Islam
did not make the veiling and seclusion of women obligatory.62 Other educated women,
particularly in Kabul, then began to abandon the veil, including growing numbers of nurses,
midwives, and teachers.63 In response, the more conservative mullahs provoked riots and acid
attacks on unveiled women,64 until Daoud had about 50 of them jailed and charged with treason
and heresy. 65 Daoud’s government quelled an armed uprising in Kandahar with advanced
weaponry obtained from the Soviet Union.66 Daoud finally released the mullahs from custody,
and they brought the unrest to a halt, agreeing that each Afghan family would be allowed to
decide for itself whether its women would practice purdah.67
In the 1960s, Afghanistan’s third constitution propelled the nation further towards
democracy and respect for human rights, but like its 1923 model it would eventually fall to a
combination of foreign intervention and the violent opposition of local radicals. This time, the
communists and fundamentalists would divide the country between them.
King Zahir Shah set out to establish a constitutional monarchy that would provide for more
democratic input and thereby build public support for the regime.68 Despite Daoud’s large
victories in winning superpower development aid and ensuring greater participation for Afghan
women in public life, the King successfully pressured him to resign as Prime Minister in 1963.69
The next year, a Loya Jirga ratified a new constitution, drafted with French assistance.70
Afghanistan’s 1964 constitution “limited the monarch’s absolute power through the creation of a
parliament and the clear separation of powers.”71 The King could no longer enact laws without
the approval of both houses of parliament.72 But he retained broad executive powers, including
the powers to declare war and command the army; to appoint the Prime Minister and one-third of
the Afghan Senate, dissolve the parliament, and veto legislation; and to appoint the members of
the Supreme Court.73 The lower house of the Afghan parliament and one-third of the Afghan
Senate would be elected to four-year terms by direct elections, subject to the King dissolving
parliament and calling new elections at any time and for any cause.74
The 1964 constitution loosened the requirements of previous Afghan constitutions that the
state be governed in accordance with Sharia law. 75 Like the 1923 constitution, it recognized
Islam as the “sacred” and official religion of Afghanistan.76 But the 1964 constitution did not
require that all Afghan laws conform to Sharia as such, stating that “there shall be no law
repugnant to the basic principles of the sacred religion of Islam and the other values embodied in
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this constitution.”77 Similarly, the constitution no longer anointed the King as the “protector of
the true religion of Islam”78 ; instead it urged him to “protect the sacred principles of the religion
of Islam.”79 These references to general “principles” provided the legislature with greater
leeway to enact laws that presented some tension with the tenets of Islamic law taken literally.80
Finally, the 1964 constitution no longer gave Sharia equal status with Afghanistan’s “general
civil and criminal laws,”81 but made it authoritative only where no statute existed in the area.82
¶22
One victory for religious conservatives in the 1964 constitution would have important
consequences in post-Taliban Afghanistan, and that is the empowerment of the judiciary to
enforce the Hanafi school of Islamic Sharia jurisprudence as Afghan law. The Hanafi school is
perhaps the least accommodating of the four major schools of Sharia law to the autonomy of
women and children, as it has traditionally been construed to allow marriages to be contracted by
a guardian on behalf of a minor child and to forbid women from securing a divorce under most
circumstances.83 The 1964 constitution stated that where no law existed in an area, “the
provisions of the Hanafi jurisprudence of the Shariaat of Islam shall be considered as law,”84 and
required Afghan court, to render justice in cases not controlled by the constitution or statutory
law “by following the basic principles of the Hanafi jurisprudence of the Shariaat of Islam….”85
¶23
Although many subsequent commentators have stressed that the 1964 Constitution granted
greater rights to Afghan women,86 the document did not make substantial advances in reforming
women’s rights within the legal or judicial system. The 1964 constitution gave all Afghan
“people” equal rights and obligations before the law, as the 1923 constitution had given all
Afghan “subjects” equal rights and duties before the law.87 Following the example of the 1923
constitution, women’s equality and most of the other rights recognized in the 1964 constitution,
including the right to liberty, property, freedom of speech and association, education, and
employment, could be limited by provisions of the law.88 The 1964 constitution did innovate by
granting Afghan women unprecedented opportunity to participate in government. Women won
the right to vote in parliamentary elections, be elected to parliament, serve as members of
government, and even become government ministers.89 These rights became a reality for the
first time in Afghan history, as women helped vote several of their number into parliament,90 and
a woman became Minister of Public Health in 1965.91
¶24
Ultimately, the 1964 constitution’s most enduring legacy may be that radical elements in
Afghan society misused its freedoms to prepare the way for dictatorship and the deaths of
countless Afghans. Afghan communists, some of whom had been barred from Kabul University
or recalled from study or work in the U.S. for expressing their radical ideas, became free to
organize.92 Although the Kabul area elected a few Afghan women and leftists as representatives
in the first elections under the 1964 Constitution, the parliament as a whole was dominated by
the rural landowners and conservative religious leaders who could afford the high costs of
running for office,93 which led many progressive young students and middle-class Afghans in
Kabul to despair of democracy, and seek more radical solutions.94 In 1965, Muhammed Taraki
and Babrak Karmal founded the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA), the
Communist Party of Afghanistan “in all but name.”95 The PDPA attracted a growing
membership among young students and intellectuals in Kabul University and the urban Afghan
middle class.96 Afghan voters elected three PDPA members to the Afghan parliament in 1965,
including Karmal.97 The Principal of Kabul Teachers College, Hafizullah Amin, joined the
PDPA and was elected to parliament in 1969.98 Each of these three men – Taraki, Karmal, and
Amin – would go on to assume the helm of dictatorial left-wing Afghan regimes.
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¶25

Prominent Afghan fundamentalists lacked the public support necessary to be elected as
such to the parliament as PDPA members were, but they organized disciplined cadres of
followers during the 1960s and 1970s. The ideas of the Egyptian fundamentalist Sayyed Qutb,
the “intellectual light” of the Muslim Brotherhood, “attracted particular interest” in the Kabul
Sharia faculty,99 which Kabul University opened in 1952.100 Al-Aznar of University in Egypt,
which had taken the Kabul Sharia faculty under its wing,101 was a center of the Muslim
Brotherhood’s fundamentalist political activity.102 The head of the Kabul Sharia department,
Professor Ghulam Muhammed Niazi, was deeply influenced by the Muslim Brotherhood’s
campaign for Islamic fundamentalist rule while studying at al-Aznar University.103 The
fundamentalist program of the Muslim Brotherhood and its progeny of jihadist groups is, in
brief, a holy war that would replace the corrupt monarchs of Muslim countries with Islamic
states that would govern all aspects of life, strictly segregating men and women and providing
“humanity a complete cure for all its ills.”104
¶26
From his perch as professor of Sharia law, Professor Niazi led the fundamentalist
movement in Afghanistan. He established cells in Kabul and Paghman dedicated to formulating
strategy, and developed contacts with sympathetic government officials.105 Joining Professor
Niazi in his campaign for an Islamic revolution in Afghanistan were two other graduates of alAzhar University, whose fundamentalism would determine the course of Afghan history for
generations: Burhannudin Rabbani and Abdul Rasul Sayyaf.106 Mr. Rabbani, who had translated
the writings of Sayyed Qutb into the Afghan language of Dari,107 succeeded Professor Niazi as
Amir of the Islamic Association of Afghanistan in 1972.108 Around this time, a young student
leader at Kabul University named Gulbuddin Hekmatyar joined the Muslim Brotherhood109 and
shortly became famous for throwing acid in the faces of unveiled Afghan women.110 Rabbani,
Sayyaf, and Hekmatyar would each go on to lead the fundamentalist revolt against the Afghan
constitutional monarchy, then the Afghan communists, and finally against the Soviet occupation
of Afghanistan. Eventually, each of them would govern entire mini-states, but none of them
could ever quite manage to bring all of Afghanistan under his faction’s control.111
Socialist and Communist Dictatorship
¶27

Despite Afghanistan’s slow but steady progress in promoting democratic input and
women’s rights under Zahir Shah, Afghan leftists demanded immediate and sweeping change.
But the socialist and communist ideology to which they turned sparked implacable opposition in
Afghanistan’s conservative religious leaders, setting the stage for the decades-long struggle
between Soviet-backed leftist governments and Pakistani-based fundamentalist jihadi fighters
¶28
With extremists organizing feverishly, the Afghan economy entered a tailspin in the early
1970s. Government corruption and a three-year drought from 1969 to 1972 brought on a famine
that killed between 100,000 and 500,000 Afghans.112 The Afghan famine provided an opening
for former Prime Minister Daoud, still popular with the Afghan military,113 to overthrow the
monarchy in 1973.114 Young officers trained in the Soviet Union executed the coup.115
Afghanistan became a republic, and Daoud its first President.116 Half of his cabinet ministers in
were communists allied with the Parcham faction of the PDPA led by Babruk Karmal, and
hundreds more communists entered government ministries and provincial officialdom.117
¶29
Daoud saw the fundamentalists as the greatest threat to a modern Afghanistan, so he
arrested Professor Niazi and 200 other fundamentalist plotters in Kabul. 118 By one account, this
action began the war between leftists and fundamentalists that continued for almost 20 years,
until the near-obliteration of the leftists and the communist movement after the dissolution of the
7

Copyright 2005 Northwestern University School of Law
Northwestern University Journal of International Human Rights

¶30

¶31

¶32

¶33

¶34

Volume 3 (Spring 2005)

Soviet Union and the mujahideen victory in 1992.119 The fundamentalists who had fled to
Pakistan from Daoud’s mass arrests, including Rabbani and Hekmatyar, helped organized a holy
war against Daoud’s regime from their new base in Pakistan.120 The most successful operation
was an incursion from Pakistan into Afghanistan’s Panjshir valley led by Ahmed Shah Massoud,
who would become one of Rabbani’s best commanders.121 The revolution failed, however, and
the fundamentalist movement splintered into factions led by Rabbani and Hekmatyar.122
The 1977 constitution granted President Daoud near-absolute powers, a common theme
among Afghan regimes following the fall of the monarchy.123 It was otherwise a profoundly
leftist document, contemplating dramatic economic and judicial reforms.124 All laws contrary to
the “basic principles” of the religion of Islam remained unconstitutional,125 and judges in the
Afghan courts would decide cases before them not governed by statutory law according to
Hanafi law.126 But for the first time in Afghan history, the country’s constitution specifically
stated that “women and men,” and not simply all Afghan “subjects” or “people,” were entitled to
equality before the law and protection against discrimination.127 A unicameral legislature elected
by all Afghans over the age of 18, half of which would be reserved for farmers and the working
class, would draft legislation.128
The 1977 constitution was never truly implemented, because even as it was being
prepared, the Soviet Union became concerned that Daoud was being drawn into a pro-American
stance with Saudi money, and began pressuring the divided Afghan communists to unite to
overthrow him, which they did.129 When Daoud issued an order for his communist opponents to
be arrested, it triggered a revolution. 130
During its long reign, and despite massive foreign aid, the monarchy had done little to
improve Afghanistan’s standing as one of the poorest, least healthy, and worst educated
countries in the world. In the late 1970s, even after some of Daoud’s reforms, 50% of Afghan
children died before reaching the age of five, 80% of Afghan children received no education, and
“the per capita income, at $157, was one of the lowest in the world.”131
In April 1978, communist military officers turned Afghanistan’s air force and tanks against
the Daoud regime.132 The air force bombed the presidential palace, killing President Daoud and
many members of his family.133 The first decree of the leaders of the revolution bestowed
ultimate authority on the head of the PDPA, Nur Muhammed Taraki.134 Another decree gave
men and women equal rights, prohibited forced marriages, established a minimum marriageable
age of 16 for girls, and reduced the bride price to a low fixed minimum amount to discourage the
widespread sale of young Afghan girls by their parents.135 “The Government called for women
to enjoy freedom, to dress as they please, work in the civil service, armed forces and other
institutions and enjoy other equal rights.”136 Taraki’s regime introduced universal education for
boys and girls and a campaign against illiteracy, and enacted a “far-reaching redistribution of
land” from large landlords to peasants.137
President Taraki’s government rapidly lost control of the country to anti-regime forces,
which in early 1979 led several Afghan provinces in open rebellion, including Nuristan and
Hazarajat.138 Iranian fundamentalists, fresh from establishing the Iranian theocracy under
Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, inspired a revolt in the large Afghan city of Herat close to the
Iranian border,139 drawing on outrage there against the government’s efforts to promote Afghan
women’s literacy.140 An army officer named Ismail Khan organized a mutiny of the Afghan
armed forces in the Herat area.141 In response, the government bombed the city and waged a
devastating assault with tanks and helicopters, killing up to 20,000 people and razing many
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buildings.142 These events prompted Prime Minister Amin, who had gained influence over the
Afghan security services, to seize power, killing his former comrade Taraki.143
In July 1979, U.S. President Jimmy Carter signed a National Security Directive authorizing
secret American aid to the Pakistan-based rebellion against the Afghan government.144 President
Carter’s National Security Adviser advised him at the time that this aid would likely result in a
Soviet invasion, and later boasted of “drawing the Russians into the Afghan trap.”145 On
December 27, 1979, Soviet forces in and around Kabul captured the main government ministries,
neutralized key Afghan army units, and fanned out to other major Afghan cities such as Herat
and Kandahar.146 Soon the Soviet occupying army reached 85,000 men. 147 Before the Red
Army’s defeat almost another 700,000 men would follow.148
The Soviets installed PDPA founder Babruk Karmal as President of Afghanistan. Karmal
promulgated a new constitution in 1980 that purported to establish the rule of the Afghan people
and recognize a similar list of individual rights as those recognized in previous constitutions.149
The constitution no longer enshrined Islam as a bulwark of the government’s legitimacy.150 All
political parties other than the PDPA were outlawed.151 With the Red Army occupying the nerve
centers of Afghan society, moreover, the Soviet leadership, rather than the PDPA or the Afghan
people, was the real power in Afghanistan during the 1980s.152
Karmal and his Soviet handlers reaffirmed and expanded the efforts of Daoud and Taraki
regimes before them to promote greater equality for Afghan women. The communists “officially
sanctioned a wider public role for women, whose status improved.”153 By 1985, 65% of the
students at Kabul University were women, and Afghan women worked in most government
agencies, social organizations, factories, the national airline, and the health care sector. 154 By
the time the communists lost power, “women accounted for 70 percent of teachers, 50 percent of
government workers, and 40 percent of medical doctors.”155 Women worked as police officers,
members of the military, and journalists.156 Afghan women increasingly appeared unveiled in
public, as their counterparts in Soviet Central Asia had done decades previously. 157 Communist
reforms intruded into Afghan family life when the communists banned the purchase and sale of
young girls as wives, and provoked rage by demanding that fathers allow their daughters to learn
to read.158 The regime’s family courts were “mostly presided over by female judges” and
protected women’s rights in marriage and divorce and to equitable child custody and support.159
Whatever hope existed for true equality between Afghan women and men, rich and poor,
was lost in the genocidal war between Soviet and Afghan communist forces and the
fundamentalist insurgents backed by the Western and wider Islamic worlds.160 Both sides
abandoned laws and constitutions in a common descent into wanton violations of human rights.
U.S. President Ronald Reagan and Pakistani dictator Zia ul-Haq directed billions in
American military aid for the mujahideen, mostly to “the more extreme Sunni fundamentalist
faction led by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar.”161 Hekmatyar used the money to organize a tightly
disciplined faction for the day when he would “impose an authoritarian Islamic state that would
sequester women and punish Moslems who don’t practice their faith.”162 With great violence,
his party forced Afghan women refugees in Pakistan to bury themselves in burqas.163 Several
Afghan women were murdered in Pakistan simply for failing to cover their hair.164
Saudi Arabia favored the armies of Abdul Rasul Sayyaf,165 whose party “recruited
thousands of fighters from Arab countries.”166 Like Hetmatyar, Sayyaf had little indigenous
support in Afghanistan, but grew powerful because of the prolific Saudi money and foreign
weaponry at its disposal. 167 In 1980, Sayyaf recruited a number of “Afghan Arabs” to the
Afghan cause,168 including Osama bin Laden, who was working with the CIA at the time.169 The
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CIA supported Pakistani efforts to “recruit radical Muslims from around the world” to fight in
Afghanistan.170 Over 35,000 radicals from Muslim countries, mostly Arabs, signed up to fight in
the “holy war,”171 and 65,000 had “direct contact” with the war.172 Over 12,000 Arabs and
others received training in “bomb-making, sabotage and urban guerrilla warfare” in camps the
CIA helped build.173 These Arab fighters would develop into the al Qaeda terrorist organization
and become the military backbone of the Taliban movement.174
By 1987, the communists and fundamentalists had killed more than one million Afghans
by some estimates,175 and had driven another seven million from their homes.176 The Soviets
carpet bombed major Afghan cities such as Herat and Kandahar into ruins, wiped half of
Afghanistan’s villages off the map, and destroyed much of the country’s farmland.177
Nevertheless, the Afghan resistance continually replenished its dead with new recruits from the
millions of refugees in Pakistan and Iran, and armed them with fresh infusions of American and
Saudi aid.178 The mujahideen gained control of up to 90% of the countryside and became
“immensely wealthy” by making it the world’s second largest opium producing land.179
Although the scale of the bombing and shelling of Afghan cities and towns posed the
greatest threat to human rights, the mujahideen’s fundamentalist policies promised to overturn
decades of progress towards including Afghan women in public life. During the 1980s, women
rarely walked the streets in rebel-controlled regions of Afghanistan.180 “Those who leave their
homes wear the chador [or burqa], a voluminous shroud covering the wearer from head to toe,
and may only survey the world through a 4-by-4-inch rectangle of netting extending from the tip
of the nose to the eyebrows.”181 In Pakistani refugee camps run by the rebels, women were
denied access to areas containing men, and prohibiting from seeing male doctors.182 (When the
Taliban continued these policies, the U.S. cited them to help justify the war.183 )
In 1987, the new Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev decided to withdraw entirely from
Afghanistan.184 The Soviets planned to leave the country to Najib Allah, the former head of the
Afghan secret police, who had taken over from Karmal as the Afghan communist leader in
1986.185 Najib Allah convened a Loya Jirga in 1987 to signal the moderation of the communist
regime’s policies. The 1987 constitution it passed once again enshrined Islam as the sacred
religion of Afghanistan and provided that no law could be contrary to its “principles” and the
other values in the constitution.186 It guaranteed equal rights to men and women and among
religious minorities in a similar manner to previous constitutions,187 and provided for a number
of individual rights to be defined in accordance with the law.188 The ruling communist PDPA
party lost its majority of seats in parliament after elections held in 1988 pursuant to the new
constitution, and a member of Daoud’s pre-communist government became Prime Minister.189
Najib Allah even reserved seats in parliament for mujahideen leaders, and invited them to lay
down their arms and participate in a mixed government, an offer that they refused.190
The Soviets completed their withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989.191 The day after the
last troops had returned, Gorbachev proposed a cease-fire between the communists and
fundamentalist parties to U.S. President George H.W. Bush, with the two superpowers agreeing
to halt shipments of weapons until democratic elections under U.N. supervision could be held.192
The Bush administration and the Afghan rebels refused to negotiate, with the result that for
years, the mujahideen supplied by the U.S. continued devastating rocket attacks on Afghan
towns and cities, killing up to 40 people in each blast.193
Nevertheless, the Afghan communist regime of Najib Allah survived, sustained by a
combination of rebel infighting and billions of dollars in Soviet military aid.194 Najib Allah
convened a Loya Jirga in 1990, promising to achieve national reconciliation and moderate the
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communist face of the Afghan government. The resulting 1990 constitution proclaimed
Afghanistan a multi-party state to be governed according to laws in conformity with the
principles of Islam, including the right to own and inherit property pursuant to Sharia law.195
The commanding heights of the economy remained state property, but private investment was
allowed, at least in theory.196 The National Assembly, selected by a mixture of direct elections
and appointments as under previous constitutions, approved laws prior to the President’s
signature,197 with a Constitutional Commission exercising limited review.198
Fundamentalist Rule
¶46

¶47

¶48

¶49

¶50

¶51

As many had predicted, the victory of the Afghan rebels brought civil war, fundamentalist
outrages, and thousands of atrocities against civilians. The “Islamic revolution” triumphed in
Kabul in April 1992.199 The military defense of Kabul unraveled due to the collapse of the
Soviet Union in 1991 and the defection of Afghan communist military commander Rashid
Dostum to the rebels in March of 1992.200 But after the communist regime fell, the war
continued. With no communists left to fight, the mujahideen leaders were left to wage a bitter
struggle for power among themselves,201 as Najib Allah had predicted in 1990.202
The mujahideen perpetrated frequent massacres and “indiscriminate killing,” as well as
“rape, torture and looting.”203 Joined by General Dostum’s tanks, Hekmatyar’s forces finished
the job of destroying Afghanistan’s housing stock and architectural heritage by rocketing the
Afghan capital Kabul into ruins.204 Almost 20,000 Afghans were killed or injured during the
fighting in 1993.205 In 1994, the United Nations reported that Kabul, spared the type of bombing
to which Kandahar had been subjected by the Soviets, had become “the most destroyed city in
Afghanistan.”206 The warring factions killed about 50,000 Kabulis207 and committed many
“medieval atrocities.”208
The victorious fundamentalist armies subjected Afghan women to some of the worst
treatment in Afghan history.209 The State Department reported that the mujaheddin were
responsible for “innumerable cases of rape.”210 Human Rights Watch described 1992-1995 as
the worst period in Afghan history, replete with “mass rapes” and the indiscriminate slaughter of
civilians.211 Mujahideen fighters kidnapped many Afghan women for purposes of sexual
slavery, as a “method of intimidating vanquished populations and of rewarding soldiers.” 212
While the soldiers of the victorious rebel armies ran wild, discipline was reserved for
Afghan women. In 1994, the Supreme Court of the Islamic state of Afghanistan issued a series
of rulings requiring a woman to “wear a full-body veil”213 and stating that she “must not leave
her house without her husband’s permission,” and “must not look at strangers.”214 Other courts
issued rulings ordering that women be stoned to death for adultery or other crimes.215
The “valiant and courageous Afghan freedom fighters”216 also persecuted religious
minorities viciously.217 On February 11 1993, the military forces of President Burhanuddin
Rabbani and his ally Abdul Rasul Sayyaf occupied a Kabul suburb populated largely with
minority Shia Hazaras. Their armies killed “‘up to 1,000 civilians’, beheading old men, women,
children and even their dogs, stuffing their bodies down the wells.”218
Finally, Afghanistan under mujahideen rule became known for training and harboring
international terrorists. Ramzi Yousef, who masterminded the 1993 World Trade Center
bombing, had fought under the command of Abdul Rasul Sayyaf, the junior partner in Rabbani’s
mujahideen government.219 The U.S. government issued a report in the 1990s in which it cited
Saudi-backed mujahideen commander Sayyaf for “continuing to harbor and train potential
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terrorists.”220 Sayyaf’s faction maintained close contact throughout the 1990s with Osama bin
Laden, and welcomed him back to Afghanistan in 1996.221
RISE AND FALL OF THE TALIBAN THEOCRACY
The Atrocities and Tyranny of the Taliban
¶52

Almost three years after the fall of the communist government, the mujahideen had failed
to establish an effective central government or national judicial system.222 Instead of
establishing law and order, their forces were killing, raping, and looting at will, and had “blocked
food and medical supplies desperately needed by [the Afghan] people.”223 An estimated 100,000
Afghans died in Kabul alone prior to the Taliban takeover in 1996.224 All told, about 400,000
Afghan civilians died in the civil wars and humanitarian disasters of the 1990s.225
¶53
In early 1994, according to their own legend, a group of former mujahideen fighters and
Islamic students, or Taliban, joined together to fight the “Muslims who had gone wrong,” and
started by freeing young boys and girls from local warlords who had kidnapped them for rape.226
As the future President of Afghanistan, Hamid Karzai, testified before Congress, the “Taliban
emerged when Afghans were desperately looking for a savior,” and their “emergence was
supported by the majority of the Afghan people” who hoped that they would “end the
bloodshed” and bring “peace and stability.”227 The Taliban selected Muhammed Omar as their
leader, a village mullah from a backward area of southern Afghanistan who had fought in the
American-backed jihad against the post-Soviet Afghan government of Najib Allah.228
¶54
The U.S. and its allies in Pakistan and Saudi Arabia initially supported the Taliban
movement.229 Their critical military, financial, and diplomatic aid to the Taliban transformed a
ragtag gang of fighters into a sophisticated army with tanks, artillery, bombers, and an
intelligence capability.230 With fresh infusions of foreign financing and manpower for each new
offensive, the Taliban defeated every major mujahideen commander. The Taliban captured
Kandahar in 1994 largely by bribing local commanders with over $1.5 million probably provided
by Saudi Arabia via Pakistan. 231 They doled out more cash to buy control of Uruzgan and Zabul
provinces,232 and occupied Herat with tens of thousands of Pakistani recruits and “arms,
ammunition, and vehicles provided by Pakistan and Saudi Arabia.”233 In 1996, Saudi and
Pakistani intelligence orchestrated the triumph of the Taliban revolution by helping ensure the
fall of Kabul and Jalalabad.234 As many as 8,000 more residents of Kabul died in the fighting
and the ensuing Taliban atrocities.235 In response, many of the mujahideen leaders whose
factions had opened the way for the Taliban revolution by abusing the Afghan population for
years formed the Northern Alliance.236 But angered by the looting and routine violence against
civilians that had characterized mujahideen rule, some Kabul residents initially welcomed the
Taliban, even after thousands of Kabulis died in the battle for the city.237
¶55
The Taliban persecuted the Shia Muslims, who then made up as much as 20% of the
Afghan population, even more brutally than had the mujahideen under Rabbani and Sayyaf. 238 A
mutiny in Mazari-Sharif opened the door to Taliban occupation of that city; although 3,000
Taliban died in an uprising that followed, the Taliban retook the city in 1998, backed by
Pakistani intelligence officers and even Pakistani troops.239 The victorious Taliban slaughtered
up to 8,000 civilians in a frenzy of killing and rape directly mostly at the Shia Hazara.240 The
Hazara holdout of Bamiyan was the last major city to fall, with more mass murders of Shias the
result, including of hospital patients roused from their beds.241 The post-Taliban governor of
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Bamiyan has estimated that 20,000 Shias and others died in this way. 242 Iran mobilized its army
to intervene against the massacres and systematic rape of Shias, but backed down under pressure
from the U.N. Security Council.243 The genocidal killing continued into 2001, as Pakistan
continued to deliver military aid to the Taliban in violation of U.N. sanctions.244
The Taliban aimed to install a government and legal system that would revive a life like
pious Muslims had lived “1,400 years ago.”245 The Attorney General of the Taliban declared:
“The Constitution is the Sharia so we don’t need a constitution.”246 The Taliban believed that
the principal purpose of the anti-Soviet jihad had been the establishment of Sharia law,247 and
indeed that is how the mujahideen leaders who had been fighting for Sharia from bases in
Pakistan even prior to the communist coup in 1978 explained their war at the time.248
Saudi Arabia, the primary backer of the Taliban along with Pakistan, served as the model
for the Taliban state.249 Saudi Arabia is a fundamentalist monarchy, whose constitution demands
allegiance to its founding King and his “children’s children” in the name of religion.250 Its
government tortures members of religious minorities and its religious police administer beatings
to women who reveal their faces, hair, or bodies in public.251 The Saudi government helped
create the Taliban, encouraged them to give refuge to bin Laden, and tutored them in
theocracy. 252 The Saudi Ministry for the Propagation of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice
trained a similar Taliban agency in enforcing Saudi-style laws, including the near-total covering
of women.253
The resulting system of Taliban law involved severe criminal sanctions, enforced with
great capriciousness and corruption, against any activities viewed as sinful or otherwise harmful.
The Taliban’s prohibitions addressed activities prohibited by religious tradition as harmful to the
person (drugs and alcohol, gambling, and usury); sexuality and Western fashions (music and
dancing, British or American hairstyles, the shaving of men’s beards, women’s high-heeled
shoes, and fashion magazines); “idolatry” (photographs, paintings, statues, and sorcery); and
other relatively harmless activities that might lead to gambling or distract from prayer
(television, sports, kite-flying and the keeping of birds as pets).254 Proving the old adage that the
law often falls behind advances in technology, however, the Taliban did not prohibit use of the
Internet until July 2001, half a decade after banning kite-flying in 1996.255
The mode of enforcement of the Taliban’s prohibitions proved as uncompromising as the
bans themselves. Torture by various methods was routine and vicious under the Taliban.256
Violations of the Taliban dress code and inappropriate male-female contact were cause for being
beaten black and blue with clubs or rifle butts.257 Implementing Taliban law required stoning
adulterers and amputating the hands of criminals, medieval punishments which had been
abandoned by most Muslim countries.258
While Afghan men suffered conscription into the Taliban army,259 bitter fighting in the
north of the country,260 imprisonment or murder for their religious or political affiliation,261 and
denial of virtually any access to entertainment or unrelated members of the opposite sex, they
enjoyed some ability to go to school, find a job, and travel. The Taliban kept Afghan women, by
contrast, largely shuttered indoors.262 Upon taking power in Kandahar in 1994, the Taliban
forbade the education of girls and the employment of most women outside of their homes.263
After becoming the rulers of most of Afghanistan in 1996, the Taliban’s religious police decreed
that women must wear all-covering burqas, which many Afghan women could not even afford
(as they cost about two months’ wages), effectively sentencing them to house arrest.264 The
Taliban ordered women to stay in their homes as much as possible, ended the rudimentary
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female education and employment that the mujahideen had allowed to continue,265 and allowed
women to see only female doctors, while banning women from practicing medicine.266
Building a New Afghan Government
¶61

¶62

¶63

¶64

¶65

The Bush administration, in response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001,
demanded that the Taliban cease harboring Osama bin Laden and the al Qaeda terrorist
organization, and threatened war and the destruction of their government if they refused. But the
Taliban declined to hand over bin Laden, the Saudi terrorist leader and mujahideen fighter
suspected of masterminding or inspiring the 9/11 attacks; bin Laden had contributed about $100
million to the Taliban by that time.267 A Taliban spokesman, however, indicated that the regime
would hand bin Laden over for trial, provided that the U.S. provided evidence of his
responsibility for the 9/11 attacks, which the U.S. had provided only to its “key allies.”268
On October 7, 2001, the U.S. began bombing al Qaeda terrorist targets and Afghan
military, electricity, and communications facilities.269 Special forces units on the ground
provided the targeting coordinates for U.S. aerial bombing, which destroyed the Taliban tanks
and troops that had held off the Northern Alliance opposition for years.270 Hundreds of Taliban
conscripts and hardcore troops died in the fighting, including many prisoners of war summarily
executed by Northern Alliance gunfire or suffocation in sealed truck containers.271 Thousands of
Afghan civilians died in the U.S. bombing raids and the ground operations that mopped up after
them.272 Whole families were cut down, sometimes as a result of apparently indiscriminate
bombing based on innacurate or misleading information.273
Driving the Taliban before them, the luminaries of the anti-Soviet jihad retook their
former positions in Herat,274 Bamiyan,275 and Kandahar,276 the prize of Kabul going to the forces
of former President Rabbani, now led by Ahmed Shah Massoud’s successor Muhammad
Fahim.277 Former mujahideen deputy foreign minister Hamid Karzai, leader of the largest
Pashtun tribe, entered Afghanistan after September 11 to raise a Pashtun rebellion against the
Taliban, joining Gul Agha Shirzai in taking Kandahar.278
The occupation of Kabul by the Northern Alliance created a political crisis for the U.S.
and the U.N., which had urged their forces to hold back from taking the city until a broad-based
government could be formed. Under pressure from the U.S. and other nations, Northern Alliance
commanders and other Afghan military factions agreed to participate in U.N.-sponsored talks
held in Bonn, Germany. Almost two dozen Afghan delegates, mostly drawn from the Northern
Alliance and the circle around former King Zahir Shah, signed an accord called for the creation
of an Interim Authority to rule Afghanistan until a Transitional Authority government could be
selected in a Loya Jirga six months later, and a “fully representative government” freely elected
two years after that.279 Although loyalists to the former King Zahir Shah initially voted that he
return to power, the U.S. and U.N. secured the delegates’ agreement to appoint Pashtun antiTaliban leader Hamid Karzai as Chairman of the Afghan Interim Authority.280
Over 1,000 elected and 700 selected delegates to the June 2002 Emergency Loya Jirga
established the Islamic Transitional Authority of Afghanistan281 and elected Hamid Karzai as its
President.282 Despite the support of a majority of delegates at one point, the former King of
Afghanistan Mohammad Zahir Shah withdrew his name from consideration for the presidency,
prompting Human Rights Watch to accuse the U.S. of “‘brazen’ interference in the loya jirga,
[which was] promoted as the birth of Afghani democracy.”283 Some delegates also objected that
mujahideen commanders who had killed innocent Afghan civilians were wielding too much
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control over the Afghan political process. “We were told that this loya jirga would not include
all the people who had blood on their hands,” said one delegate to applause.284
Warlord Theocracy and Human Rights Violations
¶66

¶67

¶68

¶69

¶70

Bonn’s aspirations for government under law and with respect for human rights have yet to
be realized throughout Afghanistan. Of course, the Karzai administration inherited a miserable
and barely functioning country from the Taliban and Northern Alliance forces who had
controlled it through 2001: average life expectancy was only 40 years, 70% of Afghans were
malnourished, more infants died in childhood and more mothers died in childbirth than in almost
any other country ever recorded in human history, and millions of children had been orphaned in
the various wars since 1978.285 But none of these poor health statistics can justify the sorts of
human rights violations that have occurred in Afghanistan since the Taliban’s fall.
The Karzai government began as “an island in a sea of uncompromising warlords” who
field large militias outside the framework of the Afghan National Army and exercise totalitarian
theocratic powers.286 Most rural areas and even major cities are not under the firm control of the
central government, especially at night.287 According to a member of the Afghanistan
Independent Human Rights Commission, “trials do not take place in accordance with law. In
provinces, warlords are the law, the judge, the government.”288
Abdul Rasul Sayyaf, a Wahhabi fundamentalist sent to Afghanistan in the 1980s by Saudi
Arabia to promote its ideology, 289 controls much of Kabul province.290 The governor of Kabul
province and many of the city’s police and intelligence officials are loyal to him, his troops
patrol western Kabul, and even President Karzai himself is reportedly “often forced to bow to
[his] demands.”291 International peacekeepers in Kabul “have publicly accused … troops under
his control of being responsible for a series of murders, abductions and extortion incidents in that
sector of the city, aided by a cadre of loyalists in the police department.”292 Following
mainstream Saudi ideology,293 his forces “continue to enforce strict Islamic social codes
including restrictions on women’s education and dress.”294 Sayyaf’s forces have tortured
villagers and old people for such crimes as listening to music.295 He views any attempt to
question his authority as a form of blasphemy, and had two newspaper editors arrested on
blasphemy charges and sentenced to death for criticizing his tactics.296
The authorities in Kandahar, Afghanistan’s second largest city, continue to implement the
rural Pashtun traditions that the Taliban proclaimed to be requirements of Islam.297 Young girls
are forced into marriage under pain of imprisonment; one received a five-year sentence for
refusing to go along with an arranged marriage.298 The police jailed another woman for refusing
to enter into a marriage with a man to whom she had been promised by her parents when she was
only two years old.299 Kandahar’s post-Taliban legal officials imprisoned a woman who escaped
after being held as a sex slave for seven years; she had been sold for about $200 during Taliban
times to a man who raped her repeatedly. 300 Because of cases like these, the head of a major
nongovernmental organization working in Afghanistan reported that she could “see no change
for most women” in Kandahar since the Taliban lost power.301
In the north, a campaign of ethnic cleansing against Pashtuns has raged. Soldiers and
armed militia in northern Afghanistan have rounded up and shot dozens of Pashtun men at a
time, raping many Pashtun women and young girls, a crime that can lead to the murder of its
victim by members of her own family in conservative rural Afghanistan.302 The militia of former
communist commander General Dostum raped whole families of women, including girls as
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young as 10.303 A U.N. official called the abuses against ethnic Pashtuns “systematic and wide
scale.”304 Thousands of Pashtuns fled their homes, some living in caves to keep warm.305
For most of the past four years, a “hardline Islamist” ruled Herat, a historically more
liberal city near the Iranian border that is widely viewed as a litmus test for human rights after
the Taliban.306 The security forces of Governor Ismail Khan borrowed a page from neighboring
Iran, which Khan called “the best model of an Islamic country in the world,”307 using beatings
and torture to silence political opponents, journalists and human right activists.308 Women
complained that his regime resembled that of the Taliban,309 as their mode of dress was confined
to two options: burqas or full-body veils (known as chadoris) that expose only the face.310 The
police in Herat ordered that 10 forced gynecological examinations be conducted every day to test
the chastity of girls or women arrested on suspicion of immoral conduct.311 Although President
Karzai promoted Ismail Khan from Governor to the Ministry of Mines in September of 2004, he
continued to field a militia, and thousands of petty warlords with similar ideologies continue to
hold power in their respective fiefdoms.312
The principal engine of theocratic tendencies on a national basis has been the Afghan
courts, the policies of which have been indistinguishable in some respects from the Taliban’s.
As a respected religious scholar among mujahideen, Sayyaf persuaded Afghan transitional
president Hamid Karzai to declare Afghanistan an “Islamic” state after the Loya Jirga, and to
ensure that “Afghanistan’s justice system will be based on the Koran and Sharia law.”313 Sayyaf,
the Northern Alliance’s “No. 2 political leader,” threatened guerilla war against the government
if his demands were not met.314 Foremost among these demands is gender apartheid.315
Sayyaf prevailed upon President Karzai to appoint as Chief Justice of Afghanistan’s
Supreme Court Fazal Hadi Shinwari, a fundamentalist member of Sayyaf’s political party who is
not even trained in Afghan constitutional or statutory law.316 Shinwari has “called for Talibanstyle punishments and brought back the Taliban’s dreaded Ministry for the Promotion of Virtue
and Prevention of Vice,” which “deploys squads to stop public displays of ‘un-Islamic’
behaviour among Afghan women.”317 A list of laws and policies being enforced in Afghanistan
reads like the Taliban’s handbook: women cannot speak in private with men, young people can
be arrested if they marry without their parents’ consent,318 women are forbidden to travel without
supervision of a male family member, married women are denied the ability to attend high
school, education of women together with men is banned, and women are restrained from
singing in public.319 Most women remain confined to their homes as many Afghan men, backed
by the judiciary, continue to treat women “according to the old Taliban ways.”320
Shinwari’s influence stretches far beyond the Supreme Court. He has “appointed most of
Afghanistan’s current judiciary -- mostly clerics in rural areas -- as well as many of the country’s
provincial governors, especially near Kabul.”321 He used this power to appoint Afghans with
only informal religious training and little experience to the bench, including almost 130 of his
political allies to the Afghan Supreme Court,322 while women judges with decades of experience
in the Afghan judiciary were denied posts.323 As a result, the Afghan courts are “dominated by
religious conservatives who have more in common with the Taliban than with Karzai.”324
The U.S. promised that an Afghan commission on judicial reform would rein in Mr.
Shinwari’s theocratic excesses. But due to the fundamentalists’ control over the political
process, judicial reform long stood at a standstill, even backsliding into increasing control by
extremists.325 The Judicial Reform Commission was dissolved in 2002, “reportedly obstructed
by religious hard-liners.”326 The Supreme Court is itself violating the constitution by being
packed with too many justices. 327 Moreover, little or nothing has been done to ensure that
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judges are qualified, that criminal defendants have access to defense attorneys, that lawyers have
access to books containing the laws currently in effect, or that endemic corruption ends.328
Prison conditions are horrifying, and torture is common.329 Far from secular reformists gaining
ground, Sayyaf himself is said to be next in line to be Afghanistan’s Chief Justice.330
THE NEW AFGHAN CONSTITUTION
The Constitution Drafting Process
¶76

The Bonn agreement provided for a Constitutional Commission to draft a new constitution
for review and adoption by a Constitutional Loya Jirga to be convened by October 2003.331
President Karzai appointed a nine-member Constitutional Drafting Commission, which included
two women,332 and a 35-member Constitutional Review Commission, which included seven
women.333 President Karzai appointed Vice President Nematullah Shahrani, a prominent
conservative, to head both commissions, a signal to many that the constitution would establish a
national religion and mandate strict religious law.334
¶77
Past Afghan constitutions failed to ensure national unity and long-term stability, partially
because the population as a whole felt excluded from the drafting process.335 To involve the
Afghan people in the framing of their constitution, the Afghan government and international
community planned to submit the draft document to a broadly representative Constitutional Loya
Jirga, which was held in December 2003.336 In addition, the U.N. helped organize a public
consultation process to include thousands of ordinary Afghans.337 Still, most rural Afghans
never heard of the constitutional process underway in their country until it was already over.338
The Ideological Battle for the Future of Afghanistan
¶78

Given the decades-old struggle within Afghan society between secularists and
fundamentalists, the role of religion in the new constitution was bound to be contentious.
Fundamentalists such as Rabbani and Sayyaf used their representatives on the Constitutional
Commission and the Supreme Court to fight for a constitutional mandate of theocracy.339
Experts warned that these leaders wanted their “conservative interpretation of Sharia law
incorporated into the next Afghan Constitution.”340 International human rights activists, on the
other hand, advocated a constitution that respected religious difference and closed the door on
the totalitarian fundamentalism that killed so many Afghans in the 1990s. A commission of
human rights activists and Islamic law scholars recommended that the new constitution shy away
from mandating one man’s version of Sharia or Islam, and retain instead the flexibility of the
1964 constitution’s requirement of governance in conformity with the “basic principles of
Islam.”341 Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch recommended other improvements
to the draft constitution in terms of religious freedom and due process.342
¶79
Afghan activists also demanded strong protection for women’s rights. Afghanistan’s
Deputy Minister for Women’s Affairs argued for an express ban on all forms of discrimination
against women and a clear requirement of universal education of Afghan women.343 A
conference convened in Kandahar of women leaders from across Afghanistan went further,
demanding an “Afghan Women’s Bill of Rights” that included equal representation in parliament
and the Constitutional Loya Jirga, compulsory education through high school with opportunities
for higher education, full property and inheritance rights and participation in economic life,
access to modern health services and reproductive care, freedom to decide whom to be married
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to, enforcement of criminal laws against violence and sexual abuse, and an end to the exchange
of women as compensation for crimes by one family against another (known as Bad).344
¶80
The draft constitution, unveiled to the public in early November 2003, proclaimed
Afghanistan an Islamic state with a national religion.345 Under the draft, no law could be
“contrary to the sacred religion of Islam,”346 Afghan judges must rule in accordance with the
provisions of the conservative Hanafi school of jurisprudence of Sharia law,347 the justices of the
Supreme Court must swear to rule in accord with the “provisions” of religion, the President must
swear an oath to safeguard religion, and the nation’s educational curriculum would be religious
in nature.348 These articles represented a significant departure from the 1964 constitution, which
required Afghan law to be consistent merely with the general “principles” of Islam rather than a
government official’s view of what the “religion” itself provides.349 Under the new draft,
“anything that is against Islam could not go forward,” because conservatives forces were
empowered to “say virtually whatever they want is against Islam.”350
¶81
The draft constitution’s almost complete silence on women’s rights proved to be its most
disappointing and even embittering flaw in the eyes of many activists for women’s rights and the
rule of law. The draft guaranteed women almost 17% of the seats in the Afghan Senate,351 but it
did not explicitly guarantee women equal rights with men or prohibit discrimination against
women, even though similar provisions are contained in several constitutions of majority Islamic
countries in the Middle East, the Central Asian former Soviet republics, and South Asia.352 Nor
did it provide Afghan women with rights of equal access to employment, education, and health
care, or with any protections against forced marriages, family violence, and sexual abuse.353
Instead it provided all Afghan “citizens” with equal rights and protection against
discrimination,354 without stating clearly that women are citizens.355 For these reasons, a Gender
and Law Working Group convened by the Ministry of Women’s Affairs prepared a number of
recommended amendments to the draft constitution, including an anti-discrimination clause,
guarantees of equal rights and full citizenship for women; an end to forced marriages and
trafficking in women; and a provision outlawing slavery and “slave-like practices.”356
The Afghan Constitution: Freedom or Theocracy?
¶82

On January 4, 2004, the 1,500 Afghan delegates to the Constitutional Loya Jirga (CLJ)
ratified the new constitution. The changes to the initial draft reflected a series of hard-fought
compromises negotiated among several factions and hundreds of individuals. World leaders,
including the President of Afghanistan, the representative of U.N. Secretary-General to
Afghanistan, the U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan, and the U.S. President, immediately hailed
the new constitution as a triumph for human rights. President Karzai called it “the most
enlightened in that part of the world.”357 The U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan praised the
document as “one of the most enlightened constitutions in the Islamic world.”358
¶83
The Afghans who participated in the constitutional drafting process, and the international
community, crafted a charter for their country that stands as an unqualified improvement over
the Taliban’s unwritten code of theocratic oppression. Among other improvements, the
constitution remedied the draft’s failure to enshrine women’s rights. It now provides that: “Any
kind of discrimination and privilege between the citizens of Afghanistan are prohibited. [¶] The
citizens of Afghanistan – whether man or woman – have equal rights and duties before the
law.”359 This clause revives precedents in the 1977 and 1987 constitutions that specifically
guaranteed that Afghan women would enjoy equal rights before the law and protection against
discrimination.360 Moreover, the new constitution envisions a level of participation by Afghan
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women in their country’s parliament that surpasses any historical precedent in that country, or
indeed in most other countries. On paper, women are guaranteed over 25% of the seats in the
lower house of parliament, and almost 17% of the upper house.361
¶84
But a close examination of the tight relationship the constitution establishes between
religious doctrine and the judiciary reveals that the claim that the new constitution is the most
“enlightened” in the region, even in the entire Islamic world, is implausible. Although women
are equal “before the law,” the intention of the Afghan courts and many of the constitution’s
drafters is that the laws will treat them very differently in many respects, and deny them many
liberties available to men. And while they may be ensured a say in parliament, their ability to
pass laws improving women’s plight in their country will be strictly limited by a veto power the
constitution grants to radical fundamentalists in the Afghan judiciary. The constitution also
omits elementary protections available to women in other countries where they have not been
subjected to the kind of treatment suffered in Afghanistan for many years, such as a ban on
slavery and slave-like practices, or a requirement that both parties consent to a marriage.362
¶85
Many Afghans and international human rights groups have accordingly tempered their
praise of the constitution. They have expressed fears that several provisions could be used to
enforce medieval interpretations of Islamic Sharia law, suppress religious expression and
political speech, and perpetuate Afghan laws and customs that ruthlessly oppress Afghan
women. An agenda to accommodate a fundamentalist future for Afghanistan permeated the CLJ,
and prevented the new constitution from realizing the promises of the U.S. and U.N. that
Afghanistan would henceforth abide by international human rights standards. The warlords and
fundamentalist leaders, who issued death threats against more moderate Afghan men and women
to deter them from participating in or even attending the CLJ, prevailed on several critical issues
that the assembly addressed.363 Their death threats and vote buying ensured that the “majority”
of CLJ delegates were tied to the “warlord controlling the province they came from.”364 Nor did
the intimidation end at the doors of the CLJ. The chairman of the CLJ, a former mujahideen
leader, announced that female delegates should not “try to put yourself on a level with men.
Even God has not given you equal rights, … because under his decision two women are counted
as equal to one man.”365 The chairman called for delegates who circulated a petition proposing
the removal of the word “Islamic” from the name of the country to be “identified and punished”
as infidels, an offense worthy of the death penalty during Afghanistan’s recent history.366
¶86
At the CLJ, the warlords that have ruled most of Afghanistan since the fall of the Taliban
succeeded in transforming a clause providing that no law could be contrary to the religion of
Islam “and the values of this Constitution” into one that says that “no law can be contrary to the
beliefs and provisions of the sacred religion of Islam.”367 Afghan experts and human rights
activists regard the new clause as much more subject to abuse by fundamentalists who seek to
impose Taliban-like theocratic rule, because the “provisions” of Islam were precisely what the
Taliban claimed to be enforcing. Female CLJ delegates and human rights activists therefore
view this provision as introducing a strict version of Sharia law by the “back door.”368 The
“beliefs and provisions” clause means “that Islamic law is the supreme law of the land,” and its
content will inevitably be left for a Supreme Court staffed by “hard line Shariah jurists” to
interpret.369 Under the new constitution, the Supreme Court, whose Chief Justice has
consistently pushed for a theocratic state in which his interpretation of Islam would hold sway,370
“can review compliance with the Constitution of laws, legislative decrees, international treaties,
and international conventions, and interpret them, in accordance with the law.”371 The
constitution grants the Supreme Court, which the Chief Justice has packed with many
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sympathetic judges who lack training in Afghanistan’s civil and secular laws, the “power to
reject virtually any law or treaty as un-Islamic.”372
¶87
While failing in some respects to adequately protect human rights, the new constitution
doesn’t do enough to prohibit Taliban and other war criminals from keeping or winning
government posts, and using them to impose fundamentalist rule. Such efforts had precedents in
Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan,373 and would be revived in post-Saddam Hussein Iraq. The
new constitution bars only those actually “convicted” of crimes against humanity from becoming
President, a Minister, or member of the National Assembly or Supreme Court.374 The
ineffectiveness of this provision results from the fact that despite “the enormous scale of war
crimes, crimes against humanity and other serious human rights violations committed in
Afghanistan, … no one has yet been tried by a competent court for crimes committed during the
long years of conflict in the country.”375 Rather than convening trials, in late 2003 coalition
forces “released the Taliban’s foreign minister from custody, and prominent Afghan officials …
invited him and other Taliban to run for office in the upcoming elections, something that millions
of Afghan women are still too afraid to do.”376 After the Karzai government took office, “many
former Taliban officials [were] sitting in the same government positions they held when Mullah
Mohammad Omar was still in charge.”377 Other Taliban officials have been wooed with “‘the
offer of a place in the government.’”378 Amnesty International thus declared the constitution’s
efforts to deny power to war criminals “meaningless.”379
¶88
In several other respects, implementation of the rights guaranteed in the constitution seems
a distant dream. Shortly after the new constitution was adopted, U.N. Secretary General Kofi
Annan’s special envoy to Afghanistan warned that “there is no rule of law in this country yet.”380
The Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission received complaints of hundreds of
murders in 2003, most blamed on government officials and militia commanders.381 The
Commission has found that “innocent people are put in jail for a very long time and for no
reason.”382 There is no sign of these practices having been put to an end by the adoption of the
new constitution.383
TEST CASES FOR THEOCRACY UNDER THE SIXTH AFGHAN CONSTITUTION
¶89

Theocracy is a recurring problem in human history because the corruption and
depredations of government by mere men make their countrymen long for a morally infallible
ruler. But when political leaders use their military power to promote their own intolerant beliefs,
the result has often been mass slaughter and widespread atrocities against members of other
faiths, as occurred in the Crusades,384 counter-Reformation Europe,385 the European colonies of
the New World 386 and Africa,387 the Ottoman Empire during and after World War I,388 postcolonial India and Pakistan,389 and Sudan since 1989.390 But even mass killings have failed to
preserve many theocracies from persistent rebellions led by subjects who chafe under the human
rulers’ arrogant misrepresentation of their own narrow views as the mandate of heaven.
¶90
In the same way, the Taliban, and before them the fundamentalists among the
mujahideen, forced Shia Muslim Afghans and secularists either to suffer repression or to take up
arms against their rulers, which massacred them in return. In the near future, Afghans may be
driven into a similar bind by theocratic policies promulgated under cover of constitutional
legitimacy. Whether this happens may depend on the success of the warlords and the
fundamentalists who dominate the Afghan judiciary in imposing fundamentalist policies that are
as damaging to human rights as those that provoke so much opposition in neighboring Iran that
mass killings and systematic torture have been deemed necessary to quell it.
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Outlawing Secular Political Parties
¶91

A significant challenge to Afghans, especially women, seeking to implement their right to
participate in parliamentary elections will be possible legal restrictions that could be used to
silence political parties represent ethnic or religious minorities, secularists, or women. The new
constitution bans political parties whose aims are “contrary to the principles of [the] sacred
religion of Islam,” as well as those that primarily appeal to members of an underrepresented
ethnic, linguistic or religious group.391 Afghan authorities understand the “principles” of Islam
to include precepts of Sharia law “agreed upon by the major schools of jurisprudence (fiqh)”; as
a result, any political party that “calls for full equality before the law of women and men could
by this reasoning be defined as contrary to Islamic principles.”392 A key test case for the
constitution will therefore be whether the political parties clause will be misused in this way.
Curtailing Political Debate

¶92

Another important test of the Afghan constitution’s ability to provide for peaceful and
democratic change will be whether it protects freedom of speech and debate. The new
constitution restricts free expression that intrudes upon religious sensitivities.393 A prominent
member of Afghanistan’s Supreme Court has declared that: “In the constitution there is an article
that says things that go against Islam are not allowed.”394 The Supreme Court has ordered two
prominent journalists and the former Minister of Women’s Affairs to stand trial on spurious
charges of blasphemy after they criticized Afghanistan’s warlords.395 Blasphemy is still an
offense that is potentially subject to the death penalty under Afghan penal laws, and
fundamentalist Afghans frequently issue death threats against people charged with it.396 The
Supreme Court actually sentenced the two reporters to death, and a female writer was also
sentenced to be executed, although none of these sentences has been carried out yet.397 Such
prosecutions could represent a serious threat to the development of Afghan democracy.
Persecuting Religious Minorities

¶93

Particularly under the Taliban but throughout Afghan history, the country’s rulers have
oppressed and murdered religious minorities, especially Shia Muslims among the Hazaras. The
new constitution provides that “[f]ollowers of other religions are free to exercise their faith and
perform their religious rites within the limits of the provisions of law.”398 But as with many
other aspects of the constitution, whether and to what extent religious minorities will be
protected depends on what the “provisions of law” limiting religious freedom may be. The Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court has declared that: “The Islamic government, according to sharia, is
bound to punish those who get involved in anti-Islamic activities…. We can punish them for
propagating other religions - such as threaten them, expel them and, as a last resort, execute
them, but only with evidence.”399 The Chief Justice believes that there are three ways to deal
with adherents of minority religions: “One, is you politely invite him to join the Muslim faith.
Two, if he refuses, insist that they obey the laws of Islam. And three, if he rejects that, [the Chief
Justice] says, ‘I have no choice’ and points to the sword above his desk, and says, ‘behead
him.’”400 The Chief Justice has also warned that anyone who preaches or describes Christianity
to Afghans may face the death penalty.401 If these statements are translated into legal doctrine,
the constitution’s protection of religious freedom may prove to be very weak.
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Enforcing Medieval Punishments
Stoning for Adultery
¶94

The Chief Justice of the Afghan Supreme Court has made clear that he wants to see
“adulterers whipped or stoned to death, the hands of robbers amputated and murderers publicly
executed.”402 Although the Old Testament of the Bible contemplates the stoning of adulterers
and other criminals, the Qur’an does not, and most modern states have abandoned the practice.403
Resuming the stoning of adulterers, as a local district court did when it ordered an Afghan
woman to be stoned to death in late April 2005, would make Afghanistan’s laws even more
theocratic than those of neighboring Iran, which abandoned the stoning of adulterers in 2002
after sentencing two women to be stoned to death the previous year.404 President Karzai has
repeatedly insisted that Afghanistan will be governed by Sharia law, which many Afghans
understand to provide for stoning in cases of adultery.405 Aides to Karzai have insisted that
stoning will not be resumed on President Karzai’s watch, and the Constitution provides the
President with the authority to reduce and pardon penalties, but only “in accordance with law.”406
But Karzai does not necessarily control what goes on in all of Afghanistan, and there is no
guarantee that Karzai will always be President to veto court-ordered stonings. And because the
Supreme Court is ultimately vested with the power to interpret the law and verify compliance
with Islam, the Chief Justice may override a Karzai pardon in an emotionally or politically
charged case.407 A renegade warlord, fundamentalist politician, or Supreme Court power grab
could therefore return Afghanistan to the days of torturing and killing women under the pretext
of piety.
Amputating Hands for Theft

¶95

The Chief Justice has pronounced that “a hand being chopped for theft” is necessary for
“obvious and justified reasons - ridding society of crime.”408 Even President Karzai has
expressed qualified support for the idea, noting that there are “strict rules” governing such
punishments and it “is extremely, extremely difficult in the real interpretation of Sharia to cut off
somebody’s hand. The hand-cutting part is only applicable, only applicable, if the society has
been provided with all the means of work and earning and making a life.”409 This is somewhat
reassuring, at least in those cases where President Karzai remains in control and convinced that
“all the means of work” were not available to a defendant. But warlords, the Supreme Court, and
future presidents may not be so gentle. Although amputation may seem preferable to some
compared to life imprisonment under constant threat of rape, the sentence meted out to petty
thieves in the U.S. under some circumstances,410 its revival would raise serious questions about
Afghanistan’s compliance with its international treaty obligations.411
Discriminating Against Women

¶96

Virtually every world religion elevates men to the position of lordship over women,
placing most forms of religious fundamentalism on a collision course with equal rights and full
participation by all citizens in a democratic government.412 Like their fundamentalist
counterparts in other nations, many powerful leaders in post-Taliban Afghanistan have a record
of holding Afghan women to a far higher standard of pious conduct than men are expected to
obey. Afghan women must shoulder most of the burden of preventing lust and extramarital sex,
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by donning burqas and denying themselves access to most public spaces.413 They must submit
to marriages against their will and not of their choosing, even under circumstances in which men
would be free to refuse. The continuation of such practices will prove all the promises of equal
rights for Afghan women before the law to be illusory.
The Burqa and Forced Covering
¶97

All of us remember how the U.S. condemned the burqa as the ultimate symbol of the
oppression of women under the Taliban and the terrorists’ ideology of “hate.” A State
Department press release issued during the Afghan war called the burqa an “infamous and
intolerable” form of torturing and imprisoning women in a “voluminous, tent-like full-body outer
garment that covers [women] from head to toe.”414 Despite all the pain and discomfort it may
cause, the allies of the U.S. in Afghanistan are still requiring women under their power to wear
the burqa. Although American television gleefully reported that Afghan women had thrown out
their burqas when the Taliban left,415 Afghan warlords are still requiring them to wear it.416
Most women still wear the burqa, not so much out of fidelity to their religious faith and the
requirements of the Qur’an – which does not even mention veils, let alone burqas – but because
they are forced to do so by the dictate of local warlords or the fear of marauding militiamen.417
“In post-Taliban Afghanistan, women have been raped for daring to think they could now go
without the burqa.”418 Future Afghan governments will decide whether the burqa is part of the
“beliefs and provisions of Islam,” or on the contrary is incompatible not only with Islam but with
the international human rights treaties to which Afghanistan is a party. The issue will likely be
resolved by the Afghan courts, which extreme fundamentalists like Sayyaf and his allies on the
Supreme Court look poised to control for the indefinite future.419
Involuntary Seclusion of Women

¶98

Women in Afghan society remain burdened by laws and practices that keep them out of the
public sphere. Religious leaders with no legal training act as judges, imprisoning young people
for such crimes as dating, falling in love, or marrying without parental permission.420 A woman
may commit a crime simply by having a conversation or being seen in public with an unrelated
man.421 The former governor of Herat announced on radio and television that the police and
Department of Vice and Virtue “must stop men and women who are unmarried from walking
together on the street” and “are obliged to beat them.”422 This iron curtain of male-female
segregation is hardly compatible with the full participation of women in a “broad-based and
representational” government, which the U.S. has defined to include women.423
Forced and Underage Marriage

¶99

More than two years after the Taliban fell, Afghan women are still being denied their rights
in marriage and to divorce under both international and Islamic law, much more often than
women in many other Islamic countries are. In July 2002, for example, almost 800 women per
day applied for divorces to the judicial authorities of the Afghan government.424 But instead of
being granted their divorces, some were imprisoned, including a dozen women subjected to
forced marriages under the Taliban.425 The judiciary continues to apply its version of the Hanafi
school of Islamic law to deny women the right to divorce under most circumstances, granting
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relief from forced marriages only in “rare” cases.426 Women who run away from home without
their husband’s permission can be sentenced to several years in prison.427
Teenage girls are still routinely forced into marriages with men they have never met, often
much older than they are. About 50% of Afghanistan’s marriages are compulsory.428 Afghan
families often sell their daughters for excessive dowries equivalent to thousands of dollars, in a
country where the average income is about $200.429 Many young women have resorted to setting
themselves on fire to escape this contemporary form of slavery.430 Over 100 Afghan women
died of self-immolation in the first ten months of 2004.431 Afghanistan’s high rate of forced
marriages is fueling this unprecedented epidemic of fiery suicides.432 Although President Karzai
has declared that there “can’t be any worse oppression” than forced marriage, the Afghan
government contributes to it by imprisoning girls and women married against their will, if and
when they flee.433 Girls and women have no legal alternative to suicide, as they are arrested and
jailed for fleeing child marriages or abusive families.434 A jailer in Kabul told a reporter that: “If
a girl in Afghanistan runs off with a boy or tries to escape from her family, that is a crime.”435
Moreover, Afghan tribal councils continue to resolve criminal cases “by ordering that the alleged
perpetrator provide the family of the alleged victim with a young girl or girls, usually below the
legal marriage age, in order to compensate for the alleged crime.”436 The girl “is then forcibly
married to a male member of the victim’s family.”437 Thus, the Afghan criminal justice system
“is more likely to violate the rights of women than to protect and uphold them.”438 The U.S. has
tolerated these policies of the government and warlords it funds and helped gain power, even
though it cited the “high rates of depression and suicide among Afghan women” as a reason to
go to war against the Taliban.439
International law recognizes forced marriage as a form of slavery to which Afghanistan
must put an end if it aspires to membership in the community of civilized nations. For example,
a treaty that Afghanistan signed on to in 1966440 obliged States parties to abolish slave-like
practices in which a “woman, without the right to refuse, is promised or given in marriage on
payment of a consideration in money or in kind to her parents, guardian, family or any
person....”441 Likewise, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights states that women and men
have equal rights before, during and after marriage,442 and that “[m]arriage shall be entered into
only with the free and full consent of the intending spouse.”443 Finally, Afghanistan’s
international obligations under the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against
Women are to guarantee that women have “the right to choose a spouse freely” and enjoy “the
same rights and responsibilities in marriage and at the time of termination of marriage.”444
Marriages of very young Afghan girls are a particularly grave problem. Young girls are
still routinely promised in marriage to bring in an income to a poor family, or to satisfy a
financial or “blood” debt.445 As a consequence, many young girls are pressured into marriages in
their early teens and even as early as seven. 446 The practice is not restricted to Afghanistan, but
is common in rural parts of India and Africa.447
The minimum marriageable age in Afghanistan is 16 by statute.448 However, the courts
refuse to enforce this law.449 Nearly two years after the Taliban fell, Amnesty International
reported one case in which a court refused to take any action on a criminal complaint against a
48 year old to whom an eight-year old girl had been forcibly married.450 This court may simply
have been implementing government policy, for the Deputy Chief Justice of the Afghan Supreme
Court has claimed that the “only source of legislation in Afghanistan is Islamic shariah law,”451
which some jurists interpret to allow a “father to contract binding marriages for both his sons and
his daughters so long as they are minors (up to the age of nine or onset of menstruation for girls
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and puberty, up to age fifteen at the latest, for boys).”452 Although some jurists maintain that a
girl may repudiate such a marriage upon attaining puberty by application to the court, social
conditions tend to vitiate this right.453
¶104
International law condemns child marriages in the same breath as other forced marriages.
Very young girls cannot be said to give their free and full consent to a marriage as required by
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.454 Theoretically, therefore, Afghan courts could
find further support in that treaty for enforcing their domestic law against child marriages.455 But
the new constitution’s deference to religious law make it more likely that the courts will rule that
the prohibitions on child marriage in international law and Afghan statutes are invalid because
they contradict a fundamentalist view of the “beliefs and provisions” of Islam.456 Such a ruling
would further diminish Afghan girls’ and women’s prospects for true “liberation.”
AN IRAQI THEOCRACY?
¶105

Despite many differences, there are important similarities between the situations in Iraq
and Afghanistan.457 Both Iraq and Afghanistan are majority Muslim countries, with populations
of similar sizes, occupied by the U.S. and its coalition allies as a result of their complicity in
international terrorism.458 As in Afghanistan, regime change in Iraq has ended the rule of a
vicious tyrant. Like Mullah Omar, Saddam Hussein presided over mass murder on a systematic
basis (although in Iraq this occurred with support from most of the U.N. Security Council, not
under conditions of international isolation as in Afghanistan). And similar struggles are
underway in both countries between religious fundamentalists, who would implement a medieval
version of religious law, and reformers who seek to modernize and secularize their society so as
to guarantee the rights of women and ethnic or religious minorities.
From the Ba’ath to a Religious State

¶106

Any discussion of human rights in Iraq’s recent history must begin with the crimes
committed by Saddam Hussein over the past few decades with the cooperation and support of
several foreign powers. Saddam’s Ba’ath Arab Socialist party seized power in a U.S.-backed
coup in 1963,459 and summarily executed thousands of Iraqi intellectuals identified as suspected
leftists on lists provided by the CIA.460 After taking the helm of the Ba’ath party in 1979,
Saddam launched two wars, against Iran in 1979 and Kuwait in 1990, which claimed the lives of
more than 600,000 Iraqis.461 In the late 1980s and early 1990s, Saddam’s military put down
Iranian-backed rebellions from the Kurdish and Shi’a communities in Iraq,462 killing 100,000 to
200,000 people.463 In order to commit these crimes, Saddam’s government secured massive
financial and military support from an array of foreign powers, including the Soviet Union,
France, China, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the U.S.464
¶107
Despite the disastrous wars, rebellions, and crimes against humanity under Saddam’s rule,
Iraq’s population increased by almost five million people from 1980 to 1990.465 Life expectancy
increased by almost 14 years on average between 1975 and 1990, as the government helped
ensure that 90% of the population had access to safe drinking water and modern facilities for
sanitation and health care.466 The 1991 Gulf War reversed much of this progress, as the U.S.
deliberately bombed water purification, sewage, and electricity facilities,467 and lobbied for
comprehensive economic sanctions to be imposed by the U.N. Security Council which
eventually led to the deaths of one million Iraqis,468 including 500,000 Iraqi children.469
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Expressing outrage at Iraq’s poor human rights record,470 floating questionable assertions
about the threat its unconventional weapons and ties to al Qaeda posed to international peace
and security,471 and rejecting Iraq’s offers to allow U.S. military access to suspected weapons
sites and to hold free elections,472 the Bush administration decided to invade the country and
depose Saddam Hussein. 473 The war claimed the lives of up to 60,000 Iraqi soldiers,474 along
with about 100,000 innocent Iraqi civilians as of September 2004.475 The Iraqi death rate more
than doubled,476 as the rates of disease, malnutrition, and infant mortality soared.477 War and
looting destroyed Iraq’s hospitals and water infrastructure along with most public buildings.478
The unemployment rate for Iraqis doubled to 60 percent,479 the remains of the water and
sanitation systems collapsed,480 and more than 3,000 schools were bombed, looted, or otherwise
destroyed.481 Hundreds of thousands of people became homeless.482
¶109
The Iraqi government appointed by the multinational forces enshrined religion as the basis
of the new Iraq. After the end of “major combat operations,” the U.S. established a Coalition
Provisional Authority (CPA) and an Iraqi Governing Council (IGC) to manage the country. The
U.S. handed 60% of the seats on the Iraqi Governing Council to Shia Muslims with longstanding ties to the theocrats in Iran. These council members subsequently used their power to
promulgate fundamentalist laws for the country, repealing more secular laws guaranteeing
women’s equality that had been enforced by the previous regime.483 Article 7 of Transitional
Administrative Law (TAL), which is intended to serve as an interim Iraqi constitution until a
more permanent one can be ratified in late 2005,484 states that: “Islam is the official religion of
the State and is to be considered a source of legislation. No law that contradicts the universally
agreed tenets of Islam, the principles of democracy, or the rights cited in Chapter Two of this
Law may be enacted during the transitional period.”485 According to a prominent commentator
on religious freedom, every Arab state whose constitution establishes an official religion in this
way has an abysmal record of respecting civil and political rights; such clauses are used to
implement “state-coerced Islamization, discrimination and even state-sanctioned persecution of
religious minorities, as, for example, in Iran, Saudi Arabia and Sudan.”486 The clause mandating
compliance with all laws with the requirements of Islam goes beyond what previous Iraqi
constitutions contemplated in fusing religion and the state, and hands religious fundamentalists
veto power over the political development of the country. 487 In effect, it establishes religious
scholars as the authorities on what Iraq’s supreme law provides, outlaws secular government,
and threatens to create a theocracy in Iraq.488
¶110
The public statements of the Iraqi fundamentalist leaders most likely to implement the
TAL confirm that its provisions make theocracy a distinct possibility. Iraq’s interim prime
minister virtually declared allegiance to Ayatollah Ali Hussein al-Sistani, describing him as
standing at the “forefront” of all of the country’s other religious authorities on the occasion of the
handover of sovereignty from the CPA. 489 The alliance of Ayatollah Sistani and the Supreme
Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq resembles the movement of Ayatollah Khomeini of
Iran in that it demands that fundamentalist religious law be used to deny equal rights to women
and religious minorities.490 The alliance receives large donations from the spiritual capital of
Iran and uses them to maintain private armies, along with a website detailing the characteristics
of the planned fundamentalist state.491 Although Ayatollah Sistani has promised to be less active
in politics than Ayatollah Khomeini believed that clerics should be, the latter also made
reassuring statements to the West about democracy, religious freedom, and women’s rights,
behaving quite differently once securely in power.492 The Iraqi Ayatollahs have been even less
¶108
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moderate in tone than Khomeini, in some respects493 ; they openly “‘use religion in order to
assume power,’” in the words of the former head of the IGC.494
¶111
In the January 2005 election, a coalition of Iraqi Shia fundamentalist parties claimed about
half of all votes, and promptly declared that religious law would be implemented.495 The
coalition will control more than 130 seats in the 275-member Iraqi National Assembly charged
with drafting a permanent constitution.496 Its architect and inspiration, Ayatollah Sistani, has
pledged that the coalition will insist upon making Islam the sole source of legislation in the
permanent constitution and prohibiting any law that is contrary to his version of Islam.497 The
close ties of leading Iraqi politicians to the Iranian theocracy do not bode well for Iraqi freedom.
With opposition to the Iranian government’s most conservative religious policies reportedly
widespread,498 some elements in the country’s leadership have resorted to torturing and
executing thousands to maintain power.499 Should Iraq follow the lead of its larger neighbor, a
similar drama may play out for decades to come, as it has in many other theocracies known to
history.
Iraqi Women Face Intensified Discrimination
¶112

Although like the Taliban, Saddam Hussein’s government implemented extremely brutal
policies against women, it also had a better record on women’s equality in some respects than
some of its Arab neighbors. The Iraqi Ba’ath party started out as a more secular, forwardlooking party towards women, and by 2002 Iraqi women could exercise more control over their
mode of dress, education, employment, and entertainment than in neighboring countries such as
Saudi Arabia, Iran, or Kuwait.500 Iraqi women made up 38% of Iraq’s doctors,501 enrolled in
primary school 50% more often than Saudi women,502 and worked as teachers and professors
50% more often than Saudi women.503 But after suffering a crisis of legitimacy after the Gulf
War in 1991, Saddam’s regime turned to violent anti-woman policies in an effort to build support
for the regime among religious and tribal conservatives. Iraq amended its Penal Code to exempt
men who murder female family members in the name of family honor, after which Iraqi men
murdered over 4,000 female relatives.504 Under the pretext of ending prostitution, progovernment paramilitary Fedayeen killed over 200 women tied to the political opposition.505
¶113
Women suffered along with many other Iraqis as a result of the war to oust Saddam. A
breakdown of law and order after the fall of Iraq’s government resulted in the rapes of hundreds
of Iraqi women.506 Violent deaths of men, women and children tripled.507 Young girls are being
sold into slavery.508 Many women are too afraid even to leave their homes, let alone participate
actively in developing a secular government that respects the equal rights of its citizens.509
¶114
Women’s minimal representation in the post-Saddam Hussein Iraqi government has
proved inadequate to protect their interests. Although women make up more than 50% of Iraq’s
population, the Bush administration gave them only two out of 25 seats on the IGC, less than
10% of the available seats.510 Despite many trained Iraqi women lawyers, only 15 out of the
thousands of people given judgeships by the CPA were women. 511 Not one of the Iraqi lawyers
hand-picked by the U.S. to draft a new constitution was a woman, 512 a record of total exclusion
that was all the more surprising because Afghanistan, with a far worse record on women’s
participation in public life, had many women involved in its constitutional drafting process.
¶115
Iraqi women judges and lawyers have decried the increased influence of religious
fundamentalists on the IGC and other Iraqi institutions. They expressed outrage when the IGC
announced reforms to Iraqi family law that would refuse women the right to divorce in most
cases and automatically deny mothers custody of children who reached the age of religious
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instruction (nine years old).513 They objected that the new laws would “allow anyone who calls
himself a cleric to open an Islamic court in his house and decide about who can marry and
divorce and have rights.”514 “This will send us home and shut the door, just like what happened
to women in Afghanistan,” one Kurdish woman lawyer declared.515 Even a member of the IGC
recognized “that the law of the tyrant Saddam was more modern than this new law.”516
Although even more extreme laws have been enforced in Afghanistan, Iraqi women have
enjoyed more educational and professional opportunities than in many other large Arab or
Muslim countries, and have not yet become accustomed to the levels of violence and disrespect
inflicted upon Afghan women. Eventually their protests prompted the CPA to drop the law
reform plan.517
¶116
With the passage of the TAL and the commencement of a constitutional drafting process
expected to be dominated by the Ayatollahs and their private armies, Iraqi women may be out of
the frying pan, and into the fire. Although the TAL guarantees women equal rights before the
law and a non-binding goal of 25 percent of seats in the Iraqi legislature, these provisions may be
meaningless if, under Article 7 of the TAL,518 Ayatollah Sistani and other Iraqi fundamentalists
get to exercise veto power over Iraq’s laws and legal system in the name of the “tenets of
Islam.”519 Among the Taliban-like laws Ayatollah Sistani would like to see implemented are
bans on: women showing their faces or most parts of their bodies in public; girls or women who
are virgins getting married without their father’s or grandfather’s permission; wives leaving their
houses without their husband’s permission; men and women dating or having a conversation in a
private place; and even simple entertainments such as music, dancing, and chess.520 He would
permit a father or grandfather to arrange the marriages of his children before puberty, and even
before the age of nine.521
¶117
While the Kurdish parties that have controlled northern Iraq since 1991 are promoted in the
U.S. media as a more moderate alternative to the Shia religious parties, their policies towards
women have also been extremely harsh. The Kurdish region they led passed a law allowing men
to kill their wives for disobedience, an offer that an estimated 550 men accepted between 1991
and 1994.522 An Iraqi women’s rights activist blamed the Kurdish nationalist parties for
complicity in more than 8,000 “honor killings” of women since they gained control over
northern Iraq.523 Like the Afghan warlords after the Taliban, the policies of these leaders may
perpetuate the oppression of women.
Iraqi Christians Flee Fundamentalist Atrocities
¶118

A key difference between Iraq and Afghanistan is that the former has a large population –
estimated at one to two million persons – of Christians, including the Assyrians, the indigenous
population of Iraq.524 Since the fall of Saddam Hussein’s regime, the one million Christian
Assyrians in Iraq have suffered continued tyranny, garbed in religious fervor rather than Ba’ath
Arab nationalism.525 Ayatollah Sistani’s legal rulings dictate that Jews and Christians are
unclean,526 and consistent with this “unclean” status, Iraqi fundamentalists have subjected their
Christian countrymen to postwar reprisals worthy of Germany just before Kristallnacht: Iraqi
Christians are being murdered in the dozens, several of their number are kidnapped and raped
each week, and many of their large businesses have been looted and burned.527 Schoolteachers
employed by the Iraqi state are preaching religion in class and forcing Christian girls to wear
veils.528 Armed bands of religious fanatics “roam the streets…, exacting their brand of what they
call God’s law.”529 Conditions are so bad that a few even recall Saddam’s old regime as being
preferable.530 Over 45,000 Iraqi Christians who survived Saddam have fled Iraq since the war.531
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While many Iraqi Christians hoped that the 2005 election would guarantee them
proportional representation in the Iraqi National Assembly that will draft a permanent
constitution, hundreds of thousands of Christian voters were denied the right to vote because
their designated polling centers never opened on election day, or had no ballots.532 Voter turnout
was only 17% in and around the Mosul area in Nineveh province, the Assyrian Christian
homeland.533 “Quite a significant number of Christians in the Mosul area were denied ballot
boxes and ballots,” the Iraqi deputy prime minister admitted.534 The result is that Christians will
be underrepresented in the constitutional drafting process.535
CONCLUSION

¶120

Referring to the liberation of Afghanistan and Iraq from dictatorship, President George W.
Bush declared, “No President has ever done more for human rights than I have.”536 President
Bush has stated that the American invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq have freed these countries
from their long histories of oppression, established or nearly established democratic rule, and
liberated women to participate equally in politics and society.
¶121
Although both nations are as close to democracy and respect for individual rights as they
have been in many years, the elevation of Iranian-style theocrats to many of their key leadership
positions remains a serious obstacle along the path to the promised freedom. The political reality
in Afghanistan and Iraq is too often that austere U.S.-backed fundamentalists control thousands
of armed militiamen with tenuous allegiance to the central government, and exploit these private
armies to distort the legal and political development of their countries towards theocracy. These
militia commanders and their allies have wantonly violated the human rights of women and
religious and ethnic minorities. Despite their many abuses, no comprehensive effort to disarm
these private armies is underway, or perhaps even possible, in either country. 537
¶122
A more complex understanding of the history of Afghanistan and Iraq, both before and
after the intervention of the U.S.-led coalitions, is critical to assessing the impact of the Bush
doctrine on human rights and respect for international law. An appreciation of the atrocities of
the Taliban and Saddam Hussein is indispensable to such an assessment. At the same time, the
influence bestowed upon fundamentalist warlords and their allies in Afghanistan has resulted in
the continuing oppression of the Afghan people, and challenges the Bush administration’s simple
narrative of a liberation from the Taliban resulting in equal rights for women and democracy for
all. Likewise, the central role of fundamentalist politicians and militia leaders in post-Saddam
Iraq should temper the triumphal attitude that followed the capture of Baghdad.
¶123
Considering the mounting human and financial cost of U.S. military operations, which
could probably save tens of millions of lives per year if devoted to international health care
spending, more thorough study of human rights justifications for U.S. military interventions is
critical.538 The historical record of U.S. “liberation” of other countries, while impressive, is
mixed. German-occupied Europe, Japan, South Korea, and Bosnia have all enjoyed remarkable
advances in human rights, democratic governance, women’s rights, and economic growth since
the U.S. and its allies toppled or repelled dictatorial regimes.539 But American colonization,
military occupation and political intervention have failed to produce lasting freedom in many
Third World countries more similarly situated to Iraq and Afghanistan. A number of countries
have actually experienced worsening human rights situations and even genocide, sometimes with
the direct involvement of the U.S. military, since the U.S. intervened in their internal affairs.540
Compared to these current and former American political protégés, the cause of women’s
equality has fared better in many respects in several other Third World countries that have not
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experienced American military occupation or political control.541 In light of the poor results of
many prominent interventions in the Third World, the Bush administration’s optimistic
projections for its reconstruction efforts appear to be premature at best, and warrant more careful
scrutiny given their large and rising costs in terms of loss of life and economic devastation.
¶124
When the fundamentalist policies of many post-Taliban Afghan warlords or Iraqi religious
parties are raised as objections to U.S. support for these forces, the typical response is to
compare these U.S. allies favorably to the Taliban or Saddam Hussein. 542 But many Afghans
and Iraqis may wonder why the practices of Afghan warlords and Iraqi fundamentalists are not
instead compared unfavorably to international human rights standards or even to the existing
practices of neighboring countries such as present-day Lebanon or Tajikistan, where
discrimination against women and religious minorities is less often practiced. For them, the right
question is not whether Afghan warlords are better than the Taliban or the Ayatollahs better than
Saddam Hussein, but whether the future Afghan and Iraqi governments will be so much better
that regime change will have justified the death and maiming of thousands of civilians in the
invasion and occupation of their lands.543 The answer will only be revealed after several decades
have passed, and the fate of U.S.-imposed “Islamic democracy” is known to history.
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